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This thesis, taking the theories of public goods, property right, and stake 
holders as the rationale, has analyzed the causes of low quality of accounting 
information and insufficiency of supply and demand from the view of economics, 
and suggested that the governing of accounting information should begin with 
rationally boundary of accounting information property rights, meanwhile carried 
out institutional innovations with company governing of enterprises’ stake holders. 
This thesis, firstly, analyzed that accounting information carried the 
characteristic of pre-public goods, would inevitably be supply and demand 
deficiency, judging by supply and demand theory, static game model and external 
economic. Secondly, it analyzed that property right of accounting information is not 
the relationship between enterprise stake holders and accounting information, but the 
benefit balance relationship among accounting information users, and due to the 
ambiguous property rights of investor, operator and other stake holders, it brings 
eternity of the accounting information inevitably。Again, it analyzed that enterprise 
should served for the benefit of not only the shareholders, but also all the stake 
holders. To some extent, enterprise stake holders are also the demanders of 
accounting information, and they would also show reverse choice and the moral 
hazard issues because of the asymmetric information between the demanders and 
controllers of accounting information which is resulted from the existence of public 
domain of enterprise contract. Thirdly, beginning with the history of accounting 
information governing, it analyzed that accounting information governing has been 
paying the priority to reinforcing supervise by government for the time being and 
dependence on path, and the self-adjustment effect of market does not bring into full 
play. Fourthly, it proposes that it is necessary to put institutional innovation into 
practice and self-adjustment ability of accounting information in the market, so as to 
reinforce accounting information governing. To sum up, This thesis put forward the 















economics, such steps, for one hand, should be taken as clarifying accounting 
information property right to cut down external diseconomy, to strengthen market 
mechanism, and to reduce transaction costs, meanwhile classifying accounting 
information as public goods, club goods or personal goods according to different 
types of accounting information, for the other hand, it emphasizes that asymmetry of 
accounting information should be reduced, and the controlling power should be 
given to the weak stake holders, and have suggested the governing pattern designed 
owing to stake holders. 
The innovations of this thesis are listed as follows: 1. Starting from the 
pre-public goods of accounting information, the analysis should include not only the 
deficiency of the accounting information but also the interest relationship of 
information users, and the negative external effects of accounting information. 
Finally the stake holders of accounting information should be put into the 
environment of enterprise and society, analyzing the Non-asymmetry of accounting 
information, which came to the conclusion that the institutional arrangement is the 
key of accounting information governing. 2. According to path dependence theory, 
the thesis suggests that it is necessary to put institutional innovation into practice and 
bring a regulating role of market into play so as to reinforcing accounting 
information governing. What is more, it is essential to depend on the standardizing 
law to give a guarantee to the institutional innovation. 3. It is pointed that the 
accounting information acted as pre-public goods in the capital market. In order to 
make the market work, accounting information could be divided into public goods, 
private goods and club goods by its service target. It is also tried to design the model 
of club goods of accounting information. 4. It is combined by the accounting 
information governing and enterprise governing, tried to put different types of stake 
holders into the governing environment of enterprise, and designed of the inner 
governing pattern of enterprise of the core stake holders.  
 













目   录 
 
 
目    录 
 




（一）国外文献综述 ························································································ 2 
（二）国内文献综述 ························································································ 4 
四、本文的结构框架和研究方法 ··········································································5 
五、本文的创新和不足 ··························································································6 




（一）会计信息作为准公共物品的供给与需求均衡的不可实现性 ············· 9 
（二）会计信息收费的静态博弈分析··························································· 11 
（三）会计信息作为准公共物品的正外部性··············································· 13 
第二章  会计信息的产权分析 ······························································15 
一、产权及会计信息产权 ····················································································15 




（一）投资者与经营者产权不清引起的会计信息负外部性 ······················· 19 
（二）投资者（或经营者）与其他利益相关者产权不清引起的会计信息 
负外部性 ······························································································ 19 














目   录 
 
二、企业利益相关者与会计信息的需求主体 ····················································22 
（一）企业利益相关者 ·················································································· 22 
（二）会计信息的需求主体 ·········································································· 23 
三、会计信息需求主体与控制主体的信息不对称 ············································24 
（一）企业契约的“公共领域”······································································· 24 
（二）会计信息的不对称性 ·········································································· 25 





第五章 基于经济学理论的会计信息治理设想 ···································31 
一、明晰会计信息的产权 ····················································································31 
（一）明晰会计信息产权的作用 ·································································· 31 
（二）会计信息完全私有化的不经济··························································· 32 
（三）会计信息的分类 ·················································································· 33 
（四）非特异性对象化会计信息的产权安排··············································· 34 
二、基于利益相关者的公司治理 ········································································35 
（一）会计信息不对称与公司治理 ······························································ 35 
（二）基于利益相关者治理的主要内容······················································· 36 

























Background of selected topic ·················································································1 
Significance of this study ······················································································1 
The document summarization at home and abroad············································2 
The document summarization abroad································································· 2 
The document summarization at home······························································· 4 
Structural frame and research method·································································5 
Innovation and shortcoming ··················································································6 
Chapter 1 The characteristic of pre-public goods of accounting  
Information································································································7 
The definition of public goods················································································7 
The pre-public goods characteristic of accounting information·························7 
The deficiency of accounting information as pre-public goods ··························9 
The impossibility of equilibrium of supply and demand of accounting  
information’s pre-public goods··········································································· 9 
The static game model analysis of charge of accounting information··············· 11 
The positive externality of accounting information as pre-public goods ·········· 13 
Chapter 2  The property rights analysis of accounting  
Information······························································································15 
The property rights and that of accounting information ··································15 
The definition of property rights······································································· 15 
The utility, connotation and particularity of accounting information················ 15 
The change of enterprise organizational forms and evolution of the property  
rights of accounting information ·········································································16 
The arrangement of the property rights of accounting information and of  
accounting information ························································································18 
The negative externality owing to the ambiguous property rights of investors  
and operators ···································································································· 19 
The negative externality owing to the ambiguous property rights of investors 
（or operators）and other benefit related entities ············································ 19 
















The character of enterprise contract and theories of stake holders·················21 
The stake holders of enterprise the demanders of accounting  
information ············································································································22 
The stake holders of enterprise ········································································· 22 
The demanders of accounting information ······················································· 23 
The asymmetry between the demanders and controllers of accounting  
information ············································································································24 
The public domain of enterprise contract ························································· 24 
The asymmetry of accounting information······················································· 25 
The result of accounting information asymmetry ············································· 26 
Chapter 4  The path dependence of accounting information  
Governing·································································································27 
The theory of path dependence············································································27 
The path dependence of accounting information offer and governing  
institutional arrangement·····················································································28 
The institutional innovation of accounting information governing ·················29 
Chapter 5  Tentative plan of accounting information governing  
Owing to economics theory····································································31 
Clarifying the property rights of accounting information ································31 
The effect of clear property rights of accounting information ·························· 31 
The diseconomy of complete privatization of accounting information ············· 32 
The classifying of accounting information ······················································· 33 
The property rights arrangement of non-peculiarity objective accounting  
information······································································································· 34 
The company governing owing to stake holders ················································35 
The asymmetry of accounting information and company governing ················ 35 
The main content of governing owing to stake holders ···································· 36 
The principles of governing owing to stake holders ········································· 37 
The pattern of company governing owing to stake holders ······························ 41 
Concluding remark·················································································44 
Reference··································································································47 
Chinese reference ································································································· 47 



























引   言 
 1
 






















































1、美国会计学会（American Accounting Association）在 1966 年的《A 









2、罗斯•L•瓦茨和杰罗尔德•L•齐默尔曼(Ross L. Watts and Jerold L. Zimmerman)
















Degree papers are in the “Xiamen University Electronic Theses and Dissertations Database”. Full
texts are available in the following ways: 
1. If your library is a CALIS member libraries, please log on http://etd.calis.edu.cn/ and submit
requests online, or consult the interlibrary loan department in your library. 
2. For users of non-CALIS member libraries, please mail to etd@xmu.edu.cn for delivery details.
厦
门
大
学
博
硕
士
论
文
摘
要
库
